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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RICHARD M. GURULE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 920099-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief and replies to the
State's brief as follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the State articulates the correct standards of
review (State's brief at 1-3), it attempts to chip away at this
Court's responsibility in reviewing the ultimate conclusions for
correctness.

See State's brief at 12-14.

The State's discussion about the "gate keeping functions of
Ramirez" and the jury's role in determining reliability along with
its concern about "overly intrusive appellate review" are
superfluous.

State's brief at 13. This Court has an obligation

under both State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), and State v.
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993), to review any underlying
factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and to
review the issue of "whether these facts are sufficient to
demonstrate reliability" for correctness.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782.

The State has the burden in the trial court "of
demonstrating the admissibility of the proferred evidence."
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778.

In assessing whether the trial court's

conclusion was correct, this Court must necessariLy consider whether
the State met its burden below.
A presumption of correctness does not attach to trial court
conclusions of law as argued by the State.

Nor does the appellate

court give deference to the trial judge's ruling under a correctness
review.

See Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).

Instead, this Court makes a de novo review to determine whether the
trial court's conclusions were correct.1

See generally Bench v.

Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1990).

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of li::e,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States
provides:

1. The State cites State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982),
for the proposition that the trial court's conclusion "deserves a
presumption of correctness" on appeal. State's brief at 13. Jones
actually says that the appellate court will "not presume either
error or prejudice" and will "assume regularity in the
proceedings." Jd. If this Court were to presume the correctness of
a trial court decision rather than making a de novo review for
correctnessf there would be little or no distinction between the
clear error and correctness standards of review.
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The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

REPLY TO STATE#S DISCUSSION OF NATURE OF ORDER
The trial judge ruled in part:
2. That the illegal entry and subsequent
seizure of the defendant requires that all
evidence acquired as a result of that illegal
entry and seizure must be suppressed.
3. That the failure of the West Valley
Police Department to accurately record the
initial descriptions given by the eyewitnesses,
and the results of the "show-up" conducted in
this case along with the suggestive circumstances
of the "show-up" itself requires suppression
under the guidelines articulated in State v.
Ramirez, supra, Art. I, § 7, Utah State
Constitution.

The judge also ruled in an initialed minute entry:
On the issue of whether eye witness
identification evidence prior to illegal search
and seizure is to be suppressed the Court rules
that such evidence may properly be offered and
admitted if otherwise competent, and is not to be
suppressed as part of the Court's prior order.
R. 126.
The State claims that these rulings allow it to ask its
witnesses during trial to make an in-court identification.

However,

the ruling explicitly allows "eyewitness identification evidence
prior to illegal search and seizure."

o

R. 126. Any in-court

identifications would be eyewitness identification evidence obtained
after the illegal seizure and showup procedure.
The State recognizes that the trial judge stated:

"I will

make it as clear as I can on the record that I havs no intention of
suppressing any evidence, identification evidence oased upon events
that occurred prior to the search."
State's brief at 8.

R. 370 (emphasis added);

The judge also stated:

". . .my finding that there may have been an
improper search of the home did not in my opinion
preclude the State from offering evidence of
events prior to the search in order to go to
trial on this matter. I would not have
suppressed any of the evidence that occurred
prior to the search, but only the subsequent
fruits of that illegal search."
R. 3 6 (emphasis added).

The State's claim that it should be allowed

to ask its witnesses to make in-court identifications after the
search and showup does not follow from this statement.
However, in the event this Court determines that there is
an ambiguity in the order which might allow an in-court
identification, the argument against admission of pre-seizure showup
identification testimony made in this brief and Appellant's opening
brief is equally applicable to any post-seizure/showup in-court
identifications.

The State failed to establish below that the

witnesses have an independent, untainted memory of the assailant,
and any in-court identification or description based on preseizure
events is therefore not admissible.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Given the State's concessions and the evidence, Dorothy
Knowlden should not be permitted to make an in-court identification
of Appellant as being present at the scene, or to testify as to any
description of a person at the scene which might be linked to
Appellant.
The State is precluded from offering testimony by Jody
Knowlden which describes Appellant as a person at the scene or an
in-court identification by Jody Knowlden.

The State failed to

present any testimony from Jody in response to Appellant's motion to
suppress, and explicitly waived its opportunity to continue the
hearing so as to allow Jody to testify.

Under such circumstances,

the State failed to establish its burden of showing that Jody was a
witness who could provide reliable identification testimony which
was untainted by the illegal showup/seizure.
The State failed to establish that Eddy Knowlden had an
independent, untainted memory of the assailant which was obtained
prior to the illegal seizure/showup procedure.

The State has failed

to show this Court that the trial judge's finding that "the police
failed to obtain or maintain any permanent record regarding
descriptions of the assailant" prior to the showup was clearly
erroneous as it pertained to Eddy.

Indeed, there is no evidence of

an independent, untainted description by Eddy.

Hence, Eddy should

not be permitted to describe the assailant or make an in-court
identification.

The State failed to establish below that Rodney Knowlden
had an untainted memory of the assailant at the scene.

Although

Rodney filled out a form describing the assailant, there was
contradictory evidence as to when the form was completed or obtained
by officers.

The trial judge was not obligated to believe Rodney's

claim that he "filled out" the form before the showup.

Nor did

Rodney's testimony establish that the form was completed and given
to officers, without any subsequent additions, before the showup.
The State failed to establish that the trial court's finding
regarding the State's failure to maintain and obtain preseizure
descriptions was clearly erroneous.

Instead, the State is

essentially asking this Court to make a de novo factual finding
despite the existence of evidence supporting the brial judge's
finding.

ARGUMENT
POINT: ANY IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION AND \NY
TESTIMONY REGARDING A DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT
WHICH WAS OBTAINED PRIOR TO THE SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP
AND ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.
In considering whether any "preseizure identification
testimony" should be admissible in this case, two concepts should be
kept in mind.

First, the trial judge ruled that a suggestive showup

and illegal search and seizure occurred.

The impact of that

suggestive procedure cannot be forgotten in analyzing whether the
State established that the witnesses have an independent, untainted
memory of what they saw at the time of the incident.
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Second, the

State had the burden of establishing the admissibility of
identification testimony in the trial court.

To the extent that it

did not bring forth evidence below, it is precluded from arguing
that such evidence can still be considered.
The analysis of whether an in-court identification may be
made or testimony regarding a pre-seizure/showup description may be
given is slightly different depending on whether the taint of a
suggestive procedure is being considered or whether the attenuation
from an illegal search and seizure is being considered.

In his

opening brief, Mr. Gurule separated these arguments as subpoints A
and B.

This reply brief uses the same organizational approach.

Mr. Gurule recognizes, however, that both analyses reach the same
conclusion that the State failed to establish that its witnesses
have distinct memories of the assailant which are untainted by the
subsequent suggestive events.

A. THE STATE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION WHICH
OCCURRED AS THE RESULT OF THE SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP
REQUIRES THAT ANY TESTIMONY REGARDING PRE-SHOWUP
DESCRIPTIONS OR IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS BE
SUPPRESSED.
In its analysis of whether the taint of the suggestive
showup requires suppression of any pre-seizure description or later
in-court identification based on pre-seizure memories, the State
seems to forget that the trial judge concluded that the showup
procedure was suggestive and unreliable and that any testimony
regarding that procedure would not be admissible.

The issue, then,

is whether, given the fact that these witnesses viewed Appellant
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during that suggestive procedure, they can nevertheless retrieve an
independent memory, unaffected by having viewed Appellant under
those circumstances.

1. Dorothy Knowlden Should Not Be Permitted to
Describe the Assailant or Make an In-court
Identification.
Appellant accepts the State's concession that it "will not
call Mrs. Knowlden to identify defendant as Dale Haddenham's
assailant."

State's brief at 9.

Appellant would also request that,

given the concessions by the State as to Mrs. Knowlden's lack of
ability to identify the assailant, this Court clarify that
Mrs. Knowlden is precluded from giving any "pre seizure" description
or in-court identification of the assailant or any descriptions,
identifications or insinuations that defendant was a person who may
have been present at the scene.

2. The State is Precluded from Presenting
Identification Testimony by Jody Knowlden.
Mr. Gurule filed his motion "to suppress statements of
witnesses relating to their identification of RICHARD M. GURULE at
the trial . . . and to suppress their in court identification of
him."

R. 20; see Addendum C in Appellant's opening brief.
The State had "[t]he burden of demonstrating the

admissibility of the proferred evidence is on the prosecution."
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778.

The State attempted to sustain this

burden below by proceeding first and calling various witnesses in
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the trial court.

See transcript of April 11, 1991 hearing.

R. 147-367.
The State did not call Jody Knowlden during this hearing
and, in fact, explicitly stated that it did not want to continue the
hearing in order to obtain testimony from Jody.

R. 361-2.

THE COURT: Did you mention the fact that there
was one other witness you needed to call,
Mr. [prosecutor]?
PROSECUTOR: That was Mr. Jody Knowlden.
Mr. Rodney Knowlden briefly mentioned he was also
outside. He was at the preliminary hearing.
[Defense counsel] has his testimony from the
preliminary hearing, so he is not a surprise
witness to [defense counsel].
THE COURT: Are you asking that we put this
matter over so we can call this witness?
PROSECUTOR: I think Mr. Jody Knowlden was
further back from the porch. He saw what went
on, but these two witnesses, Mr. Rodney Knowlden
and Mr. Eddy Knowlden, were much closer, saw it
much better.
THE COURT: I am not sure I understand. Are you
asking that we continue this matter s o —
PROSECUTOR:

No.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, all right.
in? All right.
PROSECUTOR:

Everything is

Yes, sir.

The State's failure to call Jody Knowlden or produce
evidence establishing the reliability and admissibility of any
identification testimony from Jody Knowlden precludes it from going
forward with any such testimony at this late date.

The motion to

suppress pertained to all witnesses, and the State's speculative,

_ n

eleventh hour claim in its appellate brief at 11, 23 that the State
should still be permitted to introduce evidence regarding Jody
Knowlden's identification testimony should not be entertained by
this Court, especially under these circumstances where the State
chose to forego such testimony below.

3. The State Made No Showing in the Trial Court
that Eddy Knowlden Could Give an Independent
Description Which Was Unaffected by the
Suggestive Procedure,
The issue of whether the suggestive showup procedure
tainted the pre-seizure description (or subseguent in-trial
identification) revolves around the fourth Ramires; factor—whether
the identification was the product of suggestion.
The State had the burden in the trial court of establishing
that Eddy Knowlden7s potential testimony was not the product of
suggestion.

Hence, the State's claim that

ff

[t]here is no evidence

that Eddy's description was the product of improper suggestion"
(State's brief at 21) begs the question.

The issue is whether the

State established that it was not the product of suggestion, not
whether Appellant established the reverse.
Again, it should be kept in mind that the trial judge
initially determined that the showup procedure was; suggestive and
unreliable.

His subsequent order says in essence that despite this

previous order, "eye witness identification evidence prior to
illegal search and seizure" is admissible if othei*wise competent.
R. 126. The first order regarding the suggestiveness of the
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procedure is not at issue in this Court.

The only issue for this

Court is whether, given the existence of that suggestive procedure,
the State should still be permitted to put on evidence of preseizure
descriptions (and possibly, make in-court identifications based on a
memory of those preseizure identifications).
This is a state due process analysis under Ramirez. While
federal cases may provide guidance, this Court is really concerned
with whether Ramirez and State due process allow the State to put on
such evidence where its witnesses have been impacted from seeing the
defendant in a suggestive showup (see Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774;
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986) (recognizing that "as
eye-witnesses wend their way through the criminal justice process,
their reports of what was seen and heard tend to become "more
accurate, more complete and less ambiguous")).
This issue must be viewed with an understanding that our
Supreme Court has recognized the fallibility of eyewitness
identification and perceives Article I, section 7 of the Utah
constitution as limiting the State's ability to introduce such
evidence.

See Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,

488-9 (Utah 1986).

The Court has also recognized that one's ability

to identify can be distorted by subsequent events, including
exposure to the State's question.

See Long, 721 P.2d at 494, n.8.

In Ramirez, the Court did not address, but seemed to
assume, that if the identification procedure were suggestive, any
in-court identification or pre-showup description would not be
admissible.

Indeed, in most suggestive identification cases, the

-
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assumption appears to be that where a witness is impacted by a
suggestive procedure, he at the very least no longer has a clear,
untainted memory upon which to make a later in-court identification.
The trial judge in the present case founci
13. That the police failed to obtain or
maintain any permanent record regarding
descriptions of the assailant given by tte
eyewitnesses prior to the time the "show-up"
occurred.
14. That the police failed to recoid which
of the eyewitnesses identified the defencant as
the perpetrator of the assault.2
R. 34-5.
The State makes absolutely no attempt to establish that
these findings are clearly erroneous as they relate to Eddy.

Nor

does the State make any attempt to marshal the evidence, as is
required by this Court when a party attempts to attack a trial court
finding.

Hence, this Court should accept these findings as they

relate to Eddy.
Assuming that this Court accepts these findings as
accurate, the State is unable to establish an independent memory on
Eddy's part.

The findings indicate that a record of any description

2. Officer Mattfeld testified that only one witness, Mr. Knowlden,
picked out Mr. Gurule as the assailant. R. 271, 278. He did not
say whether this was Rodney, Eddy or Jody Knowlden. He did not
record how many people or who attempted to identify Appellant.
R. 277. The lack of record in this case as to who identified
Appellant also works against including any identification
testimony. It appears that, at best, only one of these witnesses
was able to pick Mr. Gurule out of a suggestive showup. Allowing
the others to subsequently point a finger during trial at the person
sitting at the defense table would be fundamentally unfair under
these circumstances.
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was not obtained or maintained prior to the showup; obtaining a
description after the showup was too late to establish that the
description was unaffected by the procedure.
Even if the Court goes behind these findings, despite the
State's failure to marshal the evidence, it is apparent that these
findings are adequately supported by the record and are not clearly
erroneous.

See Appellant's opening brief at 74. As the State

acknowledges, it did not introduce a witness statement by Eddy.
State's brief at 22. Whether such a statement exists, and whether
it was taken prior to the showup, was a question of fact for the
trial judge.
Officer Mattfeld testified that he did not record
descriptions and that there were no reports, apparently, of the
preseizure descriptions.

R. 280. He testified that statements were

started after he entered the Gurule home but before the showup.
There is no showing as to when they were completed, and they
apparently were not begun until after the illegal seizure occurred.
R. 275. Although Rodney testified that he filled out a written
statement prior to the showup, the trial judge was not required to
find this testimony credible, especially given the chaos described
by the officers and the officers' inability to state when the
descriptions were received.
Further, Rodney's testimony does not demonstrate that Eddy
completed a statement before the showup.

Although Rodney testified

that he began filling one out, he did not state whether it was
completed before the showup, if at all.

The absence of such a written description, coupled with the
officer's testimony, demonstrates that the trial judge's finding
that the officers failed to obtain or maintain any permanent record
regarding descriptions of the assailant prior to the time the
'showup' occurred" is not clearly erroneous.3
In the absence of a clearly preserved pre-showup
description, the State did not sustain its burden below to establish
that any description testimony by Eddy would not be tainted by the
subsequent events.

4. Rodney Knowlden's Preseizure Identification
Testimony Is Not Admissible.
Again, the key to the admissibility of Rodney's testimony
is whether the State established that Rodney had a distinct,
untainted memory of the person.

The State claims that Rodney's

testimony that he "completed" his written report before the showup
establishes that the finding was clearly erroneous.
First, Rodney's testimony does not claim to have actually
completed and given the report in this case to officers before the

3. The State's claim that "[njothing in Ramirez requires written or
otherwise recorded pre-showup identifications" misses the boat. In
order to admit pre-seizure identification evidence, the State must
establish that such identification is not the product of suggestion
and is otherwise untainted. One way to do this might arguably be by
somehow recording the exact nature of that pre-seizure description
prior to the seizure. In this case, however, the Court found that
the State did not "obtain or maintain" such descriptions, based
primarily on the officer's testimony. A showing by the State that
it had obtained and preserved such descriptions before the showup
might be one way for the State to argue in a given case that a
witness' ability to testify was not tainted by subsequent events.
That did not occur in this case.

- 14 -

showup; nor was Rodney asked whether he made any additions to the
statement after the showup.

R. 233-4.

Instead, Rodney simply

testified that he "filled out" the statement before the showup.
This does not establish, even if accepted as true, that a completed
statement which was not later modified was given to police at that
time.

More importantly, the judge was not required to believe

Rodney's claim that the form was filled out before the showup.
Although Officer Mattfeld apparently gave the form to the witnesses
shortly before the showup, his testimony demonstrated that the form
was given to them after Officer Mattfeld entered the Gurule home.
R. 275.

The statements were not actually taken from witnesses

before the showup, and officers "had a poor identification as to who
they were as far as just physical descriptions."

R. 290.

The State called four police officers to testify:
Mattfeld, Ivino, Acocks, and Call.

Officers

R. 260, 294, 318, 325. These

were the only officers identified by name.

R. 295.4

None of these

officers testified that they took statements from the witnesses
prior to the showup.
that procedure.

In fact, three of them were not involved in

R. 3 07, 321, 325, 326.

Officer Mattfeld was the only officer who testified that he
talked to the witnesses before the showup.
quick, initial investigation.

R. 263.

R. 262. He made a

Then he "had the other

4. Officer Mattfeld could not remember all of the officers or the
order in which they arrived. R. 263. He thought Officers Ivino,
Call and Acocks were present plus two reserve officers and an
officer from Granite School police. R. 263. The State did not call
the last three officers to testify.

—

TK

officers obtain some information from them."

R. ;>67. None of these

other officers testified regarding what information they might have
obtained.
Officer Mattfeld testified that the written statements were
"started" after he entered the Gurule home but before the showup.
R. 275. He did not say who started such statements nor when they
were completed.

He did not include any information received in his

report and could not remember any such information.

R. 280. Under

these circumstances, the judge's finding that officers did not
obtain and maintain descriptions before the illegal seizure/showup
is supported by the evidence.
Finally, the description by Rodney is no<: detailed.

While

it indicates a short, heavy set person, it includes no facial or
hair descriptions other than a statement that the person had a small
beard.

Many people are short and heavy set with beards.5
The State has failed to show that the judge's finding that

the State had not obtained or maintained an independent description
was clearly erroneous.

That finding precludes a conclusion that

Rodney has an independent recollection from which to testify.

5. The testimony about blood on the shirt occurred at the hearing
on the motion (R. 238) and thus was not preserved as pre-showup
evidence. Rodney may well have assimilated this Information into
his memory after talking with witnesses and viewing the suggestive
identification procedure. The State's claim that this evidence
supports its argument that preseizure identification evidence should
be admissible demonstrates the difficulty with the judge's
bifurcated ruling in this case. This testimony should be
disregarded in evaluating this issue since Rodney may well have
obtained the information during the suggestive showup procedure.
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B. THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF
PRESEIZURE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE AND
POST-SEIZURE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.
The failure to obtain and maintain a record of what Eddy
and Rodney saw and could testify to before they were tainted by
seeing Mr. Gurule in the suggestive procedure after the illegal
seizure precludes admission of any identification testimony by these
witnesses.
The State's circuitous argument that the fact that Rodney
and Eddy promptly selected Mr. Gurule from the suggestive showup
evidences a disregard for the concerns regarding eyewitness
identifications which were outlined in Long and Ramirez. The State
attempts to use the results of the showup, already suppressed due to
their unreliability, to convince this Court that Eddy and Rodney
have an independent "clear memory" of the assailant.

Such reasoning

is not persuasive; the selection at the showup and claims of a
changed shirt are tainted by the procedures.

The State has not

established that independent memories are working here.
In State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 27 (Utah 1992),
the Court addressed whether a second consent given by the defendant
to open a storage unit was sufficiently attenuated from an illegal
search.

The Court looked at "the purpose and flagrancy of the

police conduct" and whether there could be "a clean break in the
chain of events between the conduct and the second consent."
Court also considered the lapse of time and other factors in
determining whether the consent was valid.

The

In the present case, the issue is whether the State
established that Rodney and Eddy could give independent, untainted
testimony.

The Thurman analysis provides very little guidance in

assessing this issue.
The State's failure to establish that either Rodney or Eddy
has an independent, untainted memory of the assailant precludes
admission of any description of the assailant or in-court
identification.
The fourth amendment violation along with the due process
violation requires suppression of any preseizure description or
post-seizure in-court identification.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court order allowing evidence of "pre-seizure" identification
testimony, and remand the case for trial absent "pre-seizure
identification" testimony or in-court identification testimony.

SUBMITTED this

lit

day of May, 1993.
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